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HOW CONSUMER REMEDIES FAIL 
Bryant G. Garth* 
No ACCESS TO LAW: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM. Edited by Laura Nader. New York: Academic Press. 
1980. Pp. xxiii, 540. $30.50. 
No Access to Law, edited by Laura Nader, culminates nearly a decade 
of anthropological research concerning consumer disputes in the United 
States. Indeed, Professor Nader's writing in this book and elsewhere has 
helped to create and sustain interest in how disputes are resolved, how law-
yers and courts are used or not used by individuals with particular 
problems, and what alternatives to the courts are available. This book, in 
particular, makes a major contribution with its richness in descriptive detail 
and its analysis of a number of representative institutions for handling indi-
vidual complaints. 
The quality of many of the institutional studies, in fact, forces the analy-
sis to go beyond the approach of the original research. 1 No Access to Law, 
in this sense, combines two different analytical frameworks - one rooted in 
optimistic assumptions about research and reform in the early 1970s, when 
the work began, and the other more pessimistic and consistent with what 
the researchers learned (and the intellectual climate today).2 This combina-
tion leads to some ambiguity, reflected notably in the two general essays, 
one by Professor Nader alone and the other co-authored by Christopher 
Shugart. Without diminishing the achievement of No Access to Law, this 
review will suggest that the authors' attempts to resolve the ambiguity ulti-
mately are unsuccessful. The political analysis can be pushed a little fur-
ther to the realization that the ideal complaint system motivating this 
research cannot be achieved through foreseeable reforms. The next ques-
tion, addressed briefly at the close of this review, is whether this discourag-
ing realization means that consumers have no hope unless the balance of 
power between consumers and business is changed. 
Some observations about the organization of the book and the studies it 
contains can first provide a better picture of the contribution made by No 
Access to Law. While the two chapters following the introductory essays 
• Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington). - Ed. 
l. Professor Nader suggests this change of focus and the ambiguity it creates: 
We initiated the study of extrajudicial alternatives expecting to find that alternative mech-
anisms were meeting the goals of an ideal complaint-handling system. Instead, our con-
clusions have led us in the opposite direction. We are left with the need to spell out why 
the systems we studied fail in the long run and how extrajudicial systems might be made 
to work. 
p. 29. 
2. I should add that my own research has also compelled me to a more pessimistic stance 
in the past couple of years. C.f. Garth, The Movement Toward Procedural /'!formalism in West• 
ern Europe and North America, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 183 (R. Abel ed. 1981 ). 
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describe examples of the "voicing" of consumer complaints, the heart of the 
book consists of nine studies of institutions for handling consumer com-
plaints, including some that are business-sponsored, some within the gov-
ernment, a labor union, media sponsored action lines, and a private 
consumer action group. Most of these institutions are oriented toward indi-
vidual disputes and address only problems that are brought to them. 
The institutional focus obviously imposes some limit on general conclu-
sions about consumers' access to law or the consequences of any lack of 
access. We do not learn, for example, how consumers with disputes (or 
grievances not yet ripened into disputes) proceed generally and what they 
obtain.3 We only see what happens when consumers do find these institu-
tions. Similarly, we get little sense for the relationship between all the pos-
sible activities an aggrieved consumer can pursue, and how they might 
relate to "law."4 Nevertheless, most of the studies provide insights beyond 
the limits of the workings of one typical or even idiosyncratic institution. 
While the anthropologist's passion for detail sometimes gets tiring here or 
leads to repetition, it also helps considerably to reveal what lies underneath 
these stories of repeated institutional "failures."5 
The important problems of defining and explaining institutional failures 
lie at the center of the book. At one level, No Access to Law is the story of 
how we ought to reform deficiencies in design and inefficiencies in execu-
tion of institutions for the processing of consumer disputes. This relatively 
technical, reform-oriented approach seems to have characterized these stud-
ies at the outset, and it relies on several basic assumptions that still can be 
found throughout the book. 
First, there are too many disputes: "an increase in complaints and dis-
putes is a sign of disorganized communities" (p. 29). Similarly, unresolved 
disputes hurt society generally by producing "alienation" and imposing dis-
turbing economic and social costs, including psychological and emotional 
ones (p. 42); "Our society is at present extremely inefficient in its handling 
of product failure" (p. 42). Reform, it seems, can benefit both consumers 
and business; but unfortunately at present "consumers and businesses are 
unable to communicate to each other their true interest in complaint resolu-
tion" (p. 43). 
Further, the best way to resolve consumer disputes is through law or 
"alternatives" that have the "force oflaw'' (p. 30). Thus, a critical problem 
in the United States is that consumers do not have an effective right to 
counsel or a right to obtain redress in the courts (p. 49). Unfortunately, 
"access to purveyors of justice is more readily available in some underde-
veloped parts of the world than it is in this country" (p. xix). 
3. See, e.g., Millei: & Sarat, Grierances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adrersary Cul-
ture, 15 LAW & SocY. REV. 525 (1980-81). 
4. For a description of empirical research designed to measure what consumers do with a 
particular kind of dispute, see J. Ladinsky, S. Macaulay & J. Anderson, The Milwaukee Dis-
pute Mapping Project: A Preliminary Report (unpublished Working Paper, University of 
Wisconsin Law School, Disputes Processing Research Program, 1979). 
5. One of my favorite examples is the description of the differences between various de-
partment stores, the changes that are taking place in the culture of the department stores, and 
how the handling of consumer complaints is affected. See Karikas & Rosenwasser, Depart-
ment Store Complaint Management, p. 283. 
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Finally, the development of appropriate judicial remedies, or efficient 
alternatives, has been hindered by the tendency to "treat each case in isola-
tion" (p. 19) and focus on "individual complaint handling" instead of "or-
ganizational change or prevention" (p. 21). Efficient consumer remedies 
will use individual disputes to identify and correct patterns of abuses in 
business and government. 
Most of the institutional studies proceed along these general lines, and 
end up emphasizing the necessity of thoroughgoing reform. Consumers do 
not do well at all in industry or business sponsored systems of complaint 
resolution, such as the Major Appliance Consumer Action Panel (MACAP) 
and the Better Business Bureau, and even relatively pro-consumer depart-
ment stores, while helpful, "failed to serve the mass of individuals who 
make up their consuming public" (p. 314). Governmental agencies are also 
unable to measure up. Even the extraordinary system of the late William 
A. Barrett, a Congressman who handled some 700 complaints per week in 
his Philadelphia office, is deemed unsuccessful: "Barrett's system fails sim-
ply because it does not provide for lasting change and improvement" (p. 
375). 
The most successful institution from the consumers' point of view turns 
out to be a private one, San Francisco Consumer Action (SFCA), which 
evolved "from a small consumer complaint switchboard to an organization 
involved in a wide range of activities from public relations work to educa-
tion, advocacy, and complaint handling by geographically scattered com-
mittees" (p. 458). Unfortunately, by early 1980, financial shortages 
prevented SFCA from continuing to handle consumer complaints. Success 
was short-lived. 
This kind of analysis appears to point to a relatively precise reform 
agenda to resolve disputes better. This agenda can be consistent with the 
interests in efficiency and in minimizing social costs shared by business, 
consumers, and the government. One conclusion might thus be that other 
institutions should emulate the successful traits of SFCA. This message of 
overcoming remediable defects through reforms in the interests of all can 
be found in many of the chapters of No Access to Law. But other aspects of 
the book argue that the nonpolitical approach is naive and unproductive. 
In particular, the introductory essays and several others point strongly be-
yond an easy reform agenda. Indeed, these studies in the end seem to lead 
to a very different conceptual approach. 
Two examples can illustrate the problem involved in any e.ff ort simply 
to "fix up" the institutions discussed in No Access to Law. The chapter on 
the Better Business Bureau (BBB), by Marian Eaton, makes clear that the 
Bureau's efforts on behalf of the consumer must be subservient to a number 
of other interests. As the author shows in some detail, the BBB depends on 
the good will and financial support of business. Indeed, it exists in order to 
promote the image of business and forestall governmental regulation: 
To convince the public that government interference is unwarranted, some 
degree of control is exerted over business practices, and to that degree the 
public interest is served. However, in striving to maintain that favorable 
image, the Bureau necessarily imposes limits on the quality of assistance 
that it gives to customers. [P. 268.] 
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There are clear limits, in short, as to how far the BBB can go toward being 
what it calls "the voice of the people in the marketplace" (p. 234). 
The chapter on three complaint-handling institutions in the inner city of 
Washington, D.C., by David Greenberg, is equally persuasive. The institu-
tions vary, including an "easy credit" ghetto retail store; an antipoverty, 
multiservice center; and a Mayor's inter-agency committee; but the chapter 
shows that, while each institution differs in aims and in commitment to 
consumer rights, the results are quite similar: "Complaint handling serves 
the needs of ghetto stores, the social agencies, _ and the city departments 
rather than those of low-income people" (p. 411). Furthermore, any sug-
gestion of practicable reforms is dismissed as largely beside the point: "[i]n 
all these complaint-handling relationships, problems are not accidental, but 
rather they are logical and predictable outcomes of the nature of the 
merchant, the welfare agencies, and the city departments" (p. 413). 
The introductory essays by Nader and Shugart also develop these 
themes. The inability of these institutions to serve consumers well does not 
appear to be remediable.6 Moreover, the point is not just that these institu-
tions do not and cannot work well: 
We can see why third-party complaint handlers are of such value to the 
complainee organizations in our society. Cooling out. is best performed by 
third parties, for otherwise the complainant would be too ready to suspect 
that he is being manipulated. The consumer is made to believe that his 
problem does not result fro_m personal or corporate inadequacy. Possible 
solutions retreat from view, and he comes to accept the difficulty as a fixed 
aspect of the world to which he must resign himself. [P. 40.] 
The institutions may work very well indeed, serving the social control inter-
ests of the complainee organizations. 
Given the actual functions served by these institutions in our society 
today, it is not surprising that the authors are pessimistic. Nader and Shu-
gart finally reach the point where they say it all boils down to a question of 
power: 
Despite the fact that we have posed consumer rights and remedies as a 
legal problem, and one with legal solutions, we know that consumer com-
plaint problems are but symptoms of larger societal problems and that the 
problem as well as the solution may be played out in other than the legal 
arena. [p. 101.] 
This quotation raises the question of why we even bother to discuss institu-
tional reforms. It is difficult to reconcile this approach with passages 
quoted earlier that suggest a general efficiency interest in reforming con-
sumer-complaint-handling institutions. 
On the one hand, as noted before, there are the suggestions that disputes 
are bad, and should be resolved; that society as a whole, including business 
and government, has an interest in effective consumer remedies; and that 
the twin problems of no access to law and no successful alternatives to law 
6. It is true that complaint handlers often suffer from poor management, careless or-
ganization, inefficient operating procedures, and lack of concern, but these factors are 
only superficial causes of ineffectiveness. The fundamental cause is that the forces con-
trolling many complaint intermediaries are not interested in creating effective mecha-
nisms for consumer as well as producer. 
p. 33. 
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account for this ineffectiveness. Now we see, however, that there is no con-
sensus to promote reform; that the "resolution" of disputes - sometimes 
just a "cooling off'' - is not always a good idea from the consumers' point 
of view; and, above all, that many of these "unsuccessful" institutions may 
be quite "successful" after all. They preserve the legitimacy of business and 
the market system without in any way threatening the power of business 
and the logic of the existing economic system. 
The coexistence of the legal-reform-oriented design of the institutional 
studies and the pessimistic, more political, conclusions thus leads to some 
ambiguity in the general analytical approach of the book. Why are we wor-
rying about "no access to law" or effective alternatives to law when real 
reform appears highly unlikely and amounts to a question of political 
power? Nader and Shugart's pessimism, however, does not prevent the of-
fering of a reform agenda designed in part to confront the problem of 
power along with the problem of designing effective remedies. They em-
phasize, in particular, the need (1) to develop a right to counsel and access 
to court (p. 49), (2) to promote consumer class actions and collective legal 
remedies instead of making a "fetish" of individual due process (p. 85), and 
(3) to encourage consumer organizations - "securing funds for independ-
ent consumer groups that operate as complaint intermediaries becomes a 
top priority" (p. 75). This thoughtful effort to be constructive and also real-
istic merits some attention, and it may be the best we can do. 
It might be suggested, however, that these remedies also could not sur-
vive the scrutiny of the political analysis that emerges as one component of 
No Access to Law. A right of access to counsel, first, does not by itselflead 
beyond individual cases toward group solutions to consumer problems. 
Even for individual consumer cases, moreover, the empirical evidence we 
have suggests that lawyers also perform a compromising and cooling-off 
function very much akin to that practiced by other institutions examined in 
the book.7 
Second, permitting more class actions in the consumer protection area 
may help consumers, but offers no guarantee that class representatives and 
lawyers will investigate many consumer abuses and bring litigation. A class 
lawsuit, we must recognize, will be brought and benefit consumers only 
when the interests of the class lawyer converge with those of the class. 
Moreover, a consumer class will not necessarily overcome the problem of 
power. Law enforcement, as the example of SPCA shows, may require 
more than litigation; it may require extensive investigative resources, lobby-
ing at various governmental levels, and the monitoring of the actual results 
of apparent victories from legislative, administrative, and judicial agencies. 8 
The easing of restrictions on class actions, therefore, might also fare poorly 
before the kind of power-oriented skepticism in this strand of No Access to 
Law .9 Class actions are not going to give consumers equality with business. 
The praise of class actions, in addition, comes with the condemnation of 
too much emphasis on individual due process; yet the watering down of 
7. See, e.g., Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Socv. REV. I 15 
(1979). 
8. See, e.g.,]. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978). 
9. See, e.g., Brill, The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assistance, 3 l Pua. INTEREST 38 (1973). 
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individual due process has many dangers and probably favors business and 
government more than consumers. Consumer defendants, for example, 
while not the subject of No Access to Law, must be remembered, and their 
individual due process rights often provide the only power they have in 
withstanding pressures to give up potential defenses. Io 
Additionally, while strengthening consumer organizations is no doubt 
important, there are some problems here as well. The first problem is how 
to do it. I 1 The SPCA experience shows the difficulty of staying alive as a 
private and independent organization. It is not clear that governmental 
policy holds out much hope for support, and if governmental funds are 
provided directly to such organizations, we will then have the problem of 
making organizations accountable to their membership. The experience of 
state-supported consumer groups in Western Europe is not very 
promising. I2 
Finally, it can be asserted consistently with Nader and Shugart's polit-
ical approach that consumer organizations are congenitally incapable of 
transcending the market system that creates the status of consumer. Even a 
very powerful, independent consumer organization cannot force companies 
to forego the profit motive for a long period of time. I3 Benefits can be 
obtained only so long as business and consumer interests are essentially in 
harmony. 
If applied consistently, therefore, the rather pessimistic political tone 
found in No Access to Law leads to little hope for the "ideal complaint-
handling system" (p. 28) sought by Professor Nader. Such a system, as 
elaborated in the introductory essay, 
would, with speed and fairness resolve grievances and would be part of an 
early alert to head off future similar complaints by providing public agen-
cies with data with which to do their jobs better. An ideal system also 
would disclose aggregate patterns of abuse or injustice and would provide 
people with a competitive number of private and public avenues and fo-
rums within which to pursue just treatment. It would work for prevention 
and deterrence. [P. 28.] 
While not free from ambiguity, No Access to Law suggests that no realiza-
ble reform could come even close to this ideal system in a society organized 
around the profit motive and dependent on the status of consumers - as 
distinct, for example, from producers. 
One plausible response to this dilemma would be that, since it is all a 
10. See, e.g., Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary System, 
11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 48 (1976). 
11. Mancur Olson reminds us of the difficulties of organizing such diffuse groups in M. 
OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982). Somewhat critical of Olson but reaching 
a similar conclusion is A. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND 
PUBLIC ACTION (1982). 
12. See N. REICH & H. MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 2-10 (1980). 
13. In fact, several of the chapters in No Access to Law document how "effective" con-
sumer protection works in favor of large enterprises and to the disadvantage of smaller enter-
prises operating at the margin and unable to pass on costs of effective consumer remedies to 
consumers. See, e.g., Eaton, The Better Business Bureau: "The Voice of the People in the Mar-
ketplace," p. 269. 
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question of political power, reformers should concentrate on increasing 
consumer power as much as possible, even if it appears that it can never 
approach anything near what it would take to implement the "ideal" sys-
tem. This Galbraithian compromise, 14 favoring as much countervailing 
power as possible, might be the final message of No Access lo Law. Polit-
ical sophistication counsels pessimism, but consumer power offers hope. 
As appealing as the consumer power approach appears to be, however, 
we might consider whether it asks for both too little and too much in the 
area of consumer remedies in the United States. If it is true that consumer 
organizations cannot realistically gain enough power to place consumers on 
equal terms with business, then the power analysis may lead to little in the 
way of improved consumer remedies. We simply wait for external forces to 
change the balance of power somehow. On the other hand, if our concern 
really is politics - e.g. , affecting decisions about corporate priorities - we 
probably should work to strengthen political movements transcending the 
narrow focus on consumer rights and remedies. Social change is unlikely to 
result from organizations of consumers. 15 
Thinking less grandiosely, however, and even if the political analysis is 
correct, we ought not succumb to the conclusion that no progress can be 
made. Consumer complaint processing can be analogized to the problem of 
waste disposal, which also has not proven to be easily solved in our soci-
ety. 16 One way to handle waste disposal is to regulate companies, but the 
regulations tend to be developed and enforced with more sensitivity to the 
companies than the public. Monitoring and enforcement can no doubt be 
strengthened if environmentalists gain some countervailing power through 
their own organizations, but here, too, there are perceptible limits. A more 
moderate, less exciting, approach is to encourage the development of pri-
vate enterprise and technology to recycle waste products at a profit. The 
''waste" is taken care of by turning it into a potentially productive resource 
within the market ecoJ?.omy. While not the same as broad social change, 
this market solution does provide some benefits that cannot be ignored. 
Consumer disputes can also be seen as waste in our society. No Access 
lo Law shows that individuals for the most part pay the costs of disposal: 
"the present set of institutions reflects our society's decision to place the 
burden of many valid grievances on customers themselves" (p. 86). There 
are limits to what the customers will bear gracefully, but businesses receive 
help from complaint-handling institutions which are subsidized by business 
or government to cool off consumers and thus bear some of the costs of 
complaint disposal. Professor Nader eloquently describes this process by 
which "[i]ntermediaries save the organizations the cost of processing dis-
putes themselves" (p. 38). 
14. See J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING 
POWER 108-53 (1956). 
15. See, e.g., M. WIEVIORKA, L'ETAT, LE PATRONAT, ET LES CONSOMMATEURS (1977), Cf. 
Cain & Kulcsar, An Essay on the Origins of the Dispute Industry, 16 LAW & Socv. REV, 375 
(1981-82). 
16. Recent criticisms of regulation, even if too s.anguine about what can be accomplished 
within the market, include: Halgren, Recycling and Resource Recovery: State and Municipal 
Legal Impediments, 1 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. LAW I (1980); Lanza,Municipal Solid Waste Regu-
lation: An Ineffective Solution to a National Problem, IO FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 215 (1982). 
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The obvious question is whether the technology is available to turn this 
waste into a resource that can be developed profitably in a manner that will 
lead companies to remedy more consumer problems in a way more consis-
tent with consumer interests. There are hints in No Access to Law that 
consumer complaints in this sense can at times be a marketable resource, 
despite the fact that the existing lawyer-client market for small claims and 
consumer complaints is not well-suited to lawyer profits coupled with con-
sumer satisfaction. The consumer action lines, for example, sometimes do 
very well in helping individual consumers while recycling consumer com-
plaints at no cost to consumers into profits for newspapers and television. 17 
San Francisco Consumer Action, it can be pointed out, took advantage of a 
law firm's willingness to reduce legal fees to provide legal services to SFCA 
members (p. 426). The class action also can be seen as a device to en-
courage lawyer entrepreneurs to find disputes and process them for a 
profit. ls 
Consumer disputes are a resource that can be exploited by certain kinds 
of creative entrepreneurs. The profit may be votes or political influence, as 
in the case of Congressman Barrett. Indeed, the Mafia may be seen as an 
organization that sells effective dispute resolutions. This is not to say that 
any of these entrepreneurial innovations will bring about anything ap-
proaching the consumers' ideal, or substitute for broad-based political ac-
tion. They do not challenge an economic system that imposes limits -
well-documented in this book - on how far we can go toward consumer 
complaint utopia. But it will be useful nevertheless to see what kinds of 
market approaches can be taken to harness the profit motive in the interest 
of benefits to consumers. The ultimate emphasis in No Access to Law on 
the structural and political impediments to consumer equality, while essen-
tial, has perhaps impeded the examination of how far consumers might go 
without structural and political change. It can be suggested, therefore, that 
we should look more carefully at how the market for disputes - so far not 
offering much to consumers -- is developing and might be affected in a way 
that is more helpful. 19 
The detail and analyses in No Access to Law provide a wealth of infor-
mation about consumer disputes. Regardless of whether the suggestions for 
research offered in that review prove fruitful in analyzing consumer dis-
putes, the point is that readers will find much to stimulate thought in this 
book. And while the book's message suffers somewhat from an ambiguity 
17. It is interesting how one such action line, Call for Action, Inc., began to market chap-
ters to television stations, even if the arrangement did not last over time. See the essay by 
Mattice. P. 517. 
18. The entrepreneurial function of the class action is emphasized in the classic article, 
Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function ef the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 715-21 
(1941). 
19. I recognize that it may appear that my suggestions are an effort to revive the reformism 
that has been shown to be ineffective. My point, however, is to acknowledge that Nader's ideal 
consumer complaint system is unattainable and to try to avoid either simply exhorting institu-
tions to do better or exhorting consumers to become more powerful. If neither of those ap-
proaches looks hopeful, it is worth at least asking if there are ways that the complaint 
processing market can develop - through new "technologies" or otherwise - to make it prof-
itable for someone to provide some better assistance to individual consumers. 
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about the social and political dimensions of consumer complaint handling 
in the United States, Professor Nader and her collaborators are to be com-
mended for confronting the political dilemmas and looking beyond easy 
solutions. 
